In Modi 3.0, New Delhi seems to be giving shape to a new neighbourhood policy – one that is premised on pragmatism, less ambitious and fussy, adapting to regional realities while de-emphasising the neighbourhood. Delhi’s famed “Neighbourhood First” appears to have been archived—and rightly so. It’s now “interests first,” as evidenced by the series of recent bilateral engagements between Delhi and its near and extended neighbours, primarily aimed at aligning those interests. Despite the confusions in India’s strategic community, Delhi’s regional policy now de-emphasizes the neighbourhood, and “Neighbourhood First” forms only a small part of its grand strategy.
If you consider the foreign visits of the prime minister and foreign minister are indicative of where the country’s foreign policy focus lies, here are the numbers. Of Modi’s post-re-election visits abroad, only 5% was to the neighbourhood (1/20). External affairs minister (EAM) Jaishankar’s visits to South Asia since June 2024 were slightly higher at 11% of the total. What really stands out is the percentage of EAM’s visits to the Middle East: 26% of his total visits.
But let’s take a step back. What is India’s ‘neighbourhood first policy’ about? Answering a question on the floor of the Lok Sabha, Jaishankar said in December last year that “The ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, which guides the management of India’s relations with countries in its immediate neighbourhood, focuses on creating mutually beneficial, people-oriented, regional frameworks for stability and prosperity, including through the building of physical, digital and people to people connectivity. India engages with these countries on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented basis…”.
His statement highlighted two points pertinent to my argument: non-reciprocity and the establishment of regional frameworks. If you take a look at Delhi’s recent conversations with neighbours, it is increasingly clear that India’s South Asia policy is increasingly shedding the pretext of non-reciprocity. The days of wooing your neighbour with ‘non-reciprocity’ either due to magnanimity or to maintain India’s regional primacy are over. This is a function of the realisation that it is simply not possible for India to maintain its unchallenged primacy in the region in an age where China too is a consequential power in South Asia. If you can’t maintain primacy, what use of magnanimity? If so, non-reciprocity is not a useful policy tool.
Let me come to the second point regarding regional frameworks. As for institutional frameworks in the region, Delhi has, of late, shown little interest in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) even as it focuses on creating connectivity frameworks with individual states of the region. But, at the same time, there has been focus on creating regional frameworks in the BIMSTEC region as was evident in the recently concluded BIMSTEC summit.
From a more conceptual point of view let me highlight three aspects of how India’s view of South Asia has changed. One, there is a growing, albeit not new, willingness to live with an imperfect South Asian neighbourhood. There is little interest in “setting things right” in the region to India’s liking. Consider the external affairs ministry’s (MEA) statement from the meeting between Modi and Myanmar’s Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing: “PM underlined the importance of early restoration of a democratic process through inclusive and credible elections, adding that India supported efforts aimed at fostering trust and advancing a transition towards a peaceful, stable and democratic future” (Emphasis mine).
In his meeting with Bangladesh’s chief adviser Muhammad Yunus on the sidelines of BIMSTEC Summit, Modi “underlined India’s desire to forge a positive and constructive relationship with Bangladesh based on pragmatism.”
What stands out are the following: One, Modi’s bilateral meetings with the unelected leader of Bangladesh and the Myanmar general who came to power through a coup did lend them a certain amount of political legitimacy; two, it highlights the fact that Delhi is no longer concerned about, and perhaps rightly so, who holds power in the neighbouring capital, and it will deal with whoever is in power without judgment; and, three, it will focus on clinically pursuing its interests vis-à-vis them with little talk of non-reciprocity or grand visions of regionalism. Delhi is accepting the state of play and is indicating that domestic politics is their business, not for India to set right.
The preference for BIMSTEC over SAARC is also a function of interest-based and pragmatic regional policy. SAARC has not worked, and there is little interest in Delhi to spend time on something that might not work in future. BIMSTEC appears to have some promise, so it makes sense to focus on that. This growing logic of interests is also evident in Delhi’s outreach to the Middle East as part of an expanded regional consciousness.
For India, South Asia is a troubled region where challenges need to be addressed and managed, not a region that should form the centre of its foreign policy vision. That is perhaps why there is a subtle, but undeclared, move away from the “Neighbourhood First” policy.
Does India really need to consolidate its power and influence in South Asia to be a global power? No. If so, does it make sense to have a neighbourhood first policy? Perhaps not. India’s foreign policy must be more ambitious than keeping the neighbourhood at the centre of it. “Neighbourhood First” policy makes sense if India wants to be a Great Power limited to South Asia.
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and is editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. Views are personal.
